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responses are more consistent, and they are easier to handle. Their im
munological response to antigens (vaccines), blood protein levels, and abilities to
convert feed into growth and to resist stresses are all increased. Some differences
between experimental groups can only be demonstrated with birds which have
been handled with TLC. Genetic selection for many factors can only be done with
chickens receiving TLC and ideal physical environments. When chickens are not
well cared for, environmental effects tend to mask their genetic potential.
To summarize, experimental animals which are exposed to TLC under good
environmental circumstances are truly superior. In addition, they experience less
trauma, and fewer are needed to obtain better quality results.
Animals employed in agriculture have similar problems to those used in
labs. Back in the days when poultry flocks were small, their environmental and
disease stresses were high. However, many of the flock owners had a real feeling
for the birds and understood their behavior. As flocks became larger, the en
vironmental and disease stresses were reduced. Administrators became more and
more remote from the birds and tended to think more about their physical needs.
than about their social ones. As the size of flocks increased, even those in direct
contact with the birds h�d less time to be cognizant of their social needs, much
less to satisfy them. Furthermore, the competitive process in the marketplac.e
which resulted in increased quality of products at decreased cost to the con
sumer tended to relegate animals to the status of things. However, this feeling is
far from universal. Many people who work with poultry today have developed an
understanding of their behavioral and social needs and therefore treat them gent
ly and with compassion. The birds perform better, and the caring people make
more profits than the uncaring. Similarly, dairy cattle and other domestic animals
which are exposed to TLC are easier to work with, more productive and of course
more profitable. Again, as in the case of laboratory animals, TLC is indirectly
beneficial to humans.
TLC is known to be an important aid in training animals. The most impressive
trainers are those who are able to obtain superb cooperation and responses from
animals without uttering harsh words or inflicting pain.
TLC is an attitude and as such cannot be put into force through legislation.
What is needed to foster a caring attitude is more widespread knowledge about
animal behavior and appreciation of the animals' needs by those who work with
them. Toward this aim, humane societies should increase their educational ef
forts directed at those who use animals as pets, in research, in testing and in
agriculture. Greater understanding of an animal's behavior results in respect for
and compassion toward animals in general. With tender loving care, the animal's
life is made more pleasant and the human's endeavors are more satisfactory.
Humane societies should also promote research on animal behavior, par
ticularly of animals that are closely associated with man. Moreover, they should
encourage colleges and universities to require courses in animal behavior for all
students who might work with animals after graduation. Among these students
are those studying biology, psychology, animal agriculture and veterinary and
human medicine. These people are especially important because they are likely
to have future decision-making power. Their actions and attitudes toward
animals will influence those with whom they work. They should be strong ad
vocates of TLC.
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TLC is not a relic of the past. Those who are presently obtaining the best
results from their work with animals are using it right now.

The "Reasonable Ground" as a Problem of the
German Animal Protection Act
Gotthard M. Teutsch, Editorial Advisory Board

The German Animal Protection Act has been widely praised for its high
ethical aims. Indeed, the law's intentions as well as its specific prohibitions
should help to ensure a remarkably advanced stage of animal protection in the
Federal Republic of Germany. However, laws can provide only a degree of deter
rence. Humane conduct depends more on moral consciousness than on the fear
of penalty.

How Effective is the Law?

One measure of the efficiency of a law is the associated number of sen
tenced violations. Other valid criteria for judgment exist, but it is difficult to ig
nore the fact that the number of sentences has been steadily decreasing since the
animal protection law went into effect in 1972. According to an estimate by K.D.
Wiegand (1979), only one out of every 5000 (unnotified as well as notified) of
fenses in the Federal Republic of Germany result in prosecution and sentencing.
The interpretive freedom allowed by the German Animal Protection Act is a
major source of its ineffectiveness in that it leaves the judge with no objective
criteria on which to base a decision. This uncertainty stems in part from the
newly-introduced phrase, "reasonable ground," a term assumed to be helpful in
evaluating judicial arguments. In reading the term "reasonable ground," the
philosophical and ethical meaning of the word "reason" cannot be overlooked.
Obviously, not every intellectually understandable cause can be accepted as a
"reasonable ground" (von Loeper, 1979). Hence the uncertainty.

Commentaries on the Meaning of "Reasonable Grounds"

Paragraph 1 of the German Animal Protection Act states the law's fun
damental aim and gives the general directive under which exceptions can be
made: "This act serves the protection and well-being of animals. No one may be
permitted to inflict pain, suffering or damage upon an animal without reasonable
grounds" (emphasis added). Although no formal explanation of the term
"reasonable ground" is offered, one can assume that a) all actions explicitly per
mitted by the Act are justified as being based on "reasonable grounds," and that
b) all actions explicitly prohibited by the Act are unjustifiable because they
evidently lack "reasonable grounds."
When situations arise which are not expressly discussed in the Act, the judge
must make his or her own decision as to what constitutes "reasonable grounds"
for exempting a particular action from the proscriptions of the law. The latitude
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involved in making a judgement is a general problem of jurisdiction and can be
found in connection with animal welfare legislation of other countries. Various
commentators on the German Animal Protection Act have explored this problem
and attempted to delineate categories of justifiable versus unjustifiable actions.
According to A. Lorz (1979), "reasonable grounds" for the killing or ill
treatment of animals do not include: annoyance, antipathy, disgust, aversion,
boredom, 'devilry', whim, indolence, lust for hunting, planning or veiling a crim
inal offense, rage, vengeance, firearm training, sensationalism, vandalism, wan
tonness, weariness or working off emotional excitement.
Professor H. Kraft (1972), one of the experts who participated in the delibera
tions which preceded the final drafting of the German Animal Protection Act,
tried to develop a system of superior, inferior, or equivalent animal uses. Among
those uses considered inferior are any of those connected with the fashion world,
personal hobbies, sports or the arts if these uses inflict animal pain, suffering,
damage or death.
Another attempt to define the difference between "reasonable" and
"unreasonable" grounds has been undertaken by E. Kadlec (1976). He concedes
that man is entitled to make use of animals or plants in order to satisfy his vital
needs. On the other hand, he rejects any misuse of animals or plants for the
fulfillment of unrestrained wants. In distinguishing between needs and wants,
Paragraph 9/1 of the Act acquires great importance. According to the regulation
in this part of the Act, experimentation on living animals is not allowed if there is
any possibility of attaining the desired result by a sound alternative method. The
underlying principle of this regulation is that a "reasonable ground" exists only as
long as the intended purpose cannot be achieved except through the use of
animals. This principle can be generalized to other areas of animal exploitation.
For example, the manufacture of fur coats may have been tolerable in former
times, but it can no longer be justified in an age of mass production of textiles
and fur substitutes which serve the same intended purposes.

A New Definition

I would like to present my own scheme for what constitutes "reasonable
grounds," based on a combination of the attempts outlined above and pro
ceeding from the assumption that purposes which are deemed justifiable entail
the minimal necessary degree of pain, suffering or damage to the animal.
Reasonable grounds for inflicting pain, suffering or damage upon an animal
exist if:
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1 . A person's I ife is being threatened by an attacking animal. (This does not in
clude bullfighting or any other situation in which humans intentionally en
danger themselves by inciting animals to attack.)
2. Animal products are to be used for food.
3. Animal products, special organs or substances (e.g., sera) are to be used to
preserve human life and health.
4. Animals are to be used in experiments necessary to the preservation of
human life and health, provided that there is no alternative method of ex
perimentation.
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5. Goods necessary to human life are being imperiled by animals.

Obviously, adherence to this code means that some of our traditional
customs and patterns of behavior must be changed. In particular, the following
practices would have to be discontinued:
1. Any killing of animals which does not fulfill vital human needs or which is
carried out under painful conditions. (This includes the renunciation of any
killing in order to obtain inessential products such as fur, etc.)
2. Painful experiments on and with living animals for nonvital purposes as well
as any experimental procedure which could be replaced by another
method.
3. The keeping of animals of whatever kind for whatever purpose under condi
tions which disregard their well-being and natural behavior.
4. Sport hunting. (Hunting is tolerated only as an aid to wildlife management
or as a means of human survival.)
5. Fishing and harpooning as a sport or hobby.
6. Animal fighting or human-animal fighting which has been arranged for
human entertainment and/or profit.
7. Exhibition of animals under conditions which disregard their well-being and
natural behavior. This particularly concerns any form of inadequate living
conditions in zoos as well as inhumane treatment in circuses and rodeos.

I realize that any attempt to define a legal term which possesses strong
moral and philosophical overtones is bound to meet with some dissatisfaction. I
myself cannot concede that the above formulations, though legally sound, are all
totally justifiable from an ethical point of view. Some may find these definitions
too radical, others may find them not radical enough. However, more radical
definitions, which are not possible under the present law, would require a respec
tive change in the ethical convictions of our society.
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